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ARROGANCE AND DEEP DISAGREEMENT
ANDREW ABERDEIN∗
I intend to bring recent work applying virtue theory to the study of argument
to bear on a much older problem, that of disagreements that resist rational reso-
lution, sometimes termed “deep disagreements”. Just as some virtue epistemol-
ogists have lately shifted focus onto epistemic vices, I shall argue that a renewed
focus on the vices of argument can help to illuminate deep disagreements. In
particular, I address the role of arrogance, both as a factor in the diagnosis of
deep disagreements and as an obstacle to their mutually acceptable resolution.
Arrogant arguers are likely to make any disagreements to which they are party
seem deeper than they really are and arrogance impedes the strategies that we
might adopt to resolve deep disagreements. As a case in point, since arrogant
or otherwise vicious arguers cannot be trusted not to exploit such strategies for
untoward ends, any policy for deep disagreement amelioration must require par-
ticularly close attention to the vices of argument, lest they be exploited by the
unscrupulous.
1. The Second Highest Mountain
Alice: Everyone knows Mount Everest is the world’s highest mountain, but
what’s the second highest?
Bob: Isn’t it Kanchenjunga? That rings a bell.
Alice: I’m not sure—that doesn’t sound right.
Alice and Bob are in disagreement. Bob thinks Kanchenjunga is the world’s
second highest mountain; Alice is not sure. Of course, there are easy remedies
for disagreements of that sort:
Bob: O.K., let’s look it up. World’s highest mountains. . . here we go, “Everest
29,029 ft, 8,848 m; K2 28,251 ft, 8,611 m; Kanchenjunga 28,169 ft, 8,586 m”. So I
was wrong—it’s not Kanchenjunga, it’s K2. Funny name.
Disagreement solved! Thank you Google and Wikipedia. But wait...
Alice: Hang on, doesn’t Everest have two peaks? I’m sure I read that some-
where. Where’s the other peak on the list?
Bob: I don’t see it. Maybe it’s much shorter than the main peak?
Alice: Let’s check. South Summit of Everest. . . “28,704 ft, 8,749 m”. That’s
weird—it’s higher than Kanchenjunga or K2! Why’s it not on the list?
Bob: One peak per mountain maybe?
Alice: No, that can’t be right! Look at Gasherbrum! It’s got four summits in
the top twenty. It must be a mistake. More fool me to trust Wikipedia.
Bob: No, Wikipedia isn’t perfect, but this is the sort of stuff it gets right. We
must be overlooking something.
Now we have a disagreement that is not so easily remedied, at least with the
resources available to Alice and Bob. Perhaps they consult Charley, a moun-
taineer:
Charley: I see the confusion. Everest does have two peaks and they’re both
higher than K2. But the South Peak doesn’t count in lists of highest peaks because
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it’s not prominent enough. Prominence measures how much a mountain sticks
up—how far down you would have to climb before you could start climbing
anything taller. For K2 that’s thousands of feet; but for the South Peak it’s only
thirty feet or so. It’s little more than a pimple off the side of Everest. Indeed the
standard route up Everest runs over the top of the South Peak. Lists of highest
peaks have prominence thresholds. Even the most inclusive, with millions of
included peaks, require a hundred feet or so of prominence, more than three
times the prominence of the South Peak.
Bob: I get it. The Wikipedia list is right after all!
Alice: Not so fast! The South Peak is a peak, however small, and it’s higher
than everything on Earth except the main peak. It should be in second place,
whatever the geographers say!
Alice and Bob are now disagreeing more profoundly. They are not just dis-
agreeing over their different beliefs or the sources of those beliefs, they are dis-
agreeing over the process by which those beliefs can be confirmed or falsified.
It’s not clear what the best way forward at this point may be. This could be an
example of what has come to be known as a deep disagreement.
2. Deep Disagreement
Deep disagreements have attracted substantial attention recently within both
epistemology and informal logic. Michael Lynch proposes the following helpful
definition of a deep disagreement, as requiring four conditions:
(1) Commonality: The parties to the disagreement share common
epistemic goal(s).
(2) Competition: If the parties affirm distinct principles with re-
gard to a given domain, those principles
(a) pronounce different methods to be the most reliable in
a given domain; and
(b) these methods are capable of producing incompatible
beliefs about that domain.
(3) Non-arbitration: There is no further epistemic principle, ac-
cepted by both parties, which would settle the disagreement.
(4) Mutual Circularity: The epistemic principle(s) in question can
be justified only by means of an epistemically circular argu-
ment (Lynch, 2010, 265).
Returning to Alice and Bob’s disagreement, we may see that they satisfy Com-
monality, at least assuming they are both sincere in their desire to identify the
world’s second highest mountain. Alice’s insistence on absolute height in con-
trast with Bob’s deference to the geographers’ prominence threshold criterion
may be seen as a difference of principle consistent with Competition. If Alice
is not prepared to accept Charley’s account (or that of any other such expert),
the disagreement would also meet the Non-arbitration criterion. We have not yet
seen enough of Alice and Bob’s epistemic principles to determine whether they
exhibit Mutual Circularity, but things do seem to be headed that way.
The literature on deep disagreement begins with Robert Fogelin. Fogelin does
not maintain that deep disagreements are common, nor that all tough disagree-
ments must be deep. For Fogelin, a deep disagreement necessarily involves “a
clash in underlying principles”, “framework propositions”, or worldviews (Fo-
gelin, 1985, 5). So epistemic principles satisfying Lynch’s Non-arbitration and
Mutual Circularity criteria would be grounded in rival worldviews. Fogelin does
explicitly invoke what we may identify as argumentational virtues—being “unbi-
ased, free of prejudice, consistent, coherent, precise and rigorous” (Fogelin, 1985,
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5). However, he does so to reject the prospect that they may prevent deep dis-
agreements: parties exhibiting such qualities may “still disagree . . . profoundly,
not just marginally” (ibid.). Strictly speaking, Fogelin is not committed to there
being no relationship between the disputants’ characters and deep disagreement,
since he leaves open the possibility that argumentational vice could still make
deep disagreements worse, even if argumentational virtue would not make them
better. But Fogelin is careful to distinguish the depth of a disagreement from its
emotional intensity, the strength of feeling with which the disputants maintain
their positions. Indeed, deep disagreements can be debated dispassionately, even
if they are more often rancourous. John Stuart Mill helps to explain why some
such disagreements, at least, are so often linked to strong feelings:
So long as an opinion is strongly rooted in the feelings, it gains
rather than loses in stability by having a preponderating weight
of argument against it. For if it were accepted as a result of ar-
gument, the refutation of the argument might shake the solidity
of the conviction; but when it rests solely on feeling, the worse it
fares in argumentative contest, the more persuaded its adherents
are that their feeling must have some deeper ground, which the
arguments do not reach: and while the feeling remains, it is al-
ways throwing up fresh intrenchments of argument to repair any
breach made in the old (Mill, 1977 [1869], 261).
Although Fogelin is concerned with cases where disagreement really does pro-
ceed from “deeper ground”, for Mill the appeal to conflicting worldviews may be
illusory or insincere. Nonetheless, intensity of emotion is to be expected in either
case. Much more recently, Michael Hannon has argued that many apparent dis-
agreements are illusory, perhaps especially those disagreements most associated
with political polarization (Hannon, 2019, 2020). Hannon draws on empirical
studies which suggest that polling data usually taken to indicate sharp disagree-
ment may be better understood as “expressive responding”, intended primarily
to signal the respondents’ allegiance (Schaffner and Luks, 2018). As Hannon
notes, not only does this suggest that there are fewer disagreements than meet
the eye, deep or otherwise, but also that there are fewer agreements: apparent
agreements can also be illusory.1
What can we do about deep disagreements? Or, as Fogelin asks, “what ra-
tional procedures can be used for their resolution?” (Fogelin, 1985, 5). His an-
swer is pessimistic: “The drift of this discussion leads to the answer: NONE”
(ibid.). That does not mean that deep disagreements cannot be resolved but it
does suggest that the resolution procedure may not be entirely rational. Fogelin
quotes Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: “I said I would ‘combat’ the other man—but
wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end
of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert
natives.)” (Wittgenstein, 1972, ¶612). This is a somewhat sinister analogy for
persuasion without reasons. Maybe a resolution could be found if one side suc-
ceeded in persuading the other, but such “persuasion” might be a higher price
than we wish to pay. More recent authors have not all been so pessimistic. Scott
Aikin has compiled this invaluable survey (Aikin, 2019, 421):
PESSIMISM: In deep disagreement, argument is impossible.
Non-engagement: In deep disagreements, one should not
try to engage (Campolo, 2005, 2019).
1This echoes the “Abilene paradox” of deceptive agreement: in the eponymous example, a family of
four talk themselves into a long, unpleasant drive in a Texas summer because each believes the others
are in agreement that it is a good idea (Harvey, 1974).
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Polemical: In deep disagreements, one should use non-
argumentative or alternative argumentative techniques
(Kraus, 2012; Barris, 2015; Duran, 2016).
OPTIMISM: In deep disagreements, argument is possible and
can be effective.
Prudential: One can discern deep disagreements only if
one continues to argue; so one’s defaults should be set
on arguing (Adams, 2005).
Practical: Argument in deep disagreements prevents worse
options (Lynch, 2010, 2012; Kappel, 2012; Jønch-Clausen
and Kappel, 2015).
Arbitrational: Some deep disagreement cases can be re-
solved by an impartial third party (Memedi, 2007).
Supplemental: Argument in deep disagreement can pro-
duce or uncover shared reasons (Davson-Galle, 1992;
Goodwin, 2005; Godden and Brenner, 2010).
Internal: Internal argument is still possible in deep dis-
agreements (Finocchiaro, 2011; Zarefsky, 2012).2
Theoretical: Absolutely deep disagreements are impos-
sible, since insofar as one can identify an other as one
with whom one disagrees, one must see that other as
one with whom one can argue (Feldman, 2005; Phillips,
2008; Siegel, 2014).
As we have seen, Fogelin is inclined to pessimism. I shall also pay most attention
to the pessimistic response, although I note an ambiguity in what Aikin terms
the polemical position: “alternative argumentative techniques” covers both alter-
natives to argumentation and alternative forms of argumentation.
3. Prominence and Depth
I shall suggest that some of the puzzles presented by deep disagreement can be
at least clarified by a diversion into physical geography—specifically, the concept
of “prominence”, which Charley introduced in §1.3 Here are two more technical
(but equivalent) definitions of prominence:
(1) The minimum vertical distance one must descend from a
point in order to reach a higher point.
(2) The difference between the elevation of a point, and the el-
evation of the lowest contour line that contains it and no
higher point (Kirmse and de Ferranti, 2017, 788).
As we saw in §1, prominence explains why the world’s second highest mountain
is K2, not the South Peak of Everest, even though the latter is further above
sea level than the former: lists of highest peaks have prominence thresholds.4
Prominence provides a measure of depth: how far down you have to climb before
you can start climbing back up. Consider three peaks on an island, as in Fig. 1.
The prominence of the highest peak is its height above sea level, since you would
have to leave the island to find anything higher. The prominence of the second
highest peak is its height above the highest col it shares with the highest peak and
2Finocchiaro defines an internal argument as one “in which one derives a conclusion not acceptable
to an opponent from claims acceptable to him” (Finocchiaro, 2011, 32). In other words, it is Lockean
ad hominem, or argument ex concessis, to which I will return in §5.
3The following account is based on that presented in (Aberdein, 2020).
4Traditionally, 100, 300, or 2000 ft: worldwide more than seven million peaks meet the first threshold,
over 250 times as many as meet the last (Kirmse and de Ferranti, 2017, 800).
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the prominence of the lowest peak is its height above the highest col it shares with
the second highest peak. Hence the prominence of the lowest peak represents a
lower bound on how far down individuals on the two lower peaks would need
to climb in order to be on the same level. It is only a lower bound because
the peaks may differ significantly in height. More generally, we might define the
relative prominence of one peak with respect to some higher peak as its prominence
ignoring all peaks of intermediate height. Thus, for any pair of peaks, the relative
prominence of the lower peak is a lower bound on how far down individuals on
each peak would need to climb to attain the same level.
17/2/2018 21:36Prominence definition
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Figure 1. An island with three peaks: the vertical lines indi-
cate the prominence of each peak; the horizontal lines the lowest
contour line encircling it but no higher summit. (Adapted from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Topographic_prominence.)
In order to draw an analogy with deep disagreement, we need an analogue
for disagreement depth in terms of physical height. Some superficially plausible
analogues for height ay be ruled out. For example, it can’t just be a measure
of emotional intensity: as we have seen, deep disagreements are often heated,
but not necessarily so. Nor can it be a measure on revision of belief sets: the
proportion of each disputant’s beliefs that would need to be suspended or revised
in order for common ground to be reached. Although deeply disagreeing parties
may disagree about many things, the scope of their disagreement need not be all
that great. (Notoriously so, in some cases: the “narcissism of minor differences”
(Freud, 1961, 68).) A more plausible candidate would be a measure on how
deeply entrenched are the points of contention (or the principles upon which
they depend) within each disputant’s belief set (see Ga¨rdenfors, 1988, 86 ff.).
Only disagreements that reach the worldview of at least one of the disputants
will count as deep. So, just as lists of peaks have prominence thresholds, we may
now reserve “deep” for disagreements that exceed this threshold.
To summarize this topographic analogy, two disputants who at least suspend
(dis)belief on the matters at issue for the duration of their argument are on shared
level ground. Insofar as they sincerely disagree, either or both disputants stand
on a summit from which they would need to climb down to reach level ground.
For most disagreements, that is easy to do; but for deep disagreements, the de-
scent will be an arduous endeavour, requiring substantial (and risky) restructur-
ing of worldviews to accommodate revised epistemic principles. The contours
of the terrain represent objective features of the disagreement. However, the dis-
putants (or any other observer) may be mistaken as to where they stand: some
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cols are not as deep as they seem; others much deeper. Many disputants ar-
rive at their summits by chance, others by choice. Notably, Mill’s emotive ar-
guers, whose disagreement “rests solely on feeling”, purposefully avoid the level
ground on which honest debate may take place by racing up (what they take to
be) the highest available peak and refusing to descend.
4. Arguing Virtuously or Viciously
For the last decade or so, I have been one of several people making the case
for a virtue theory of argumentation. Virtue theories and argumentation are as
old as philosophy itself, perhaps older, but the explicit application of the former
to the latter is a much more recent development. Most philosophical studies of
argument emphasize technical aspects of argument success or failure, but they
pay much less attention to the broader context of arguing, and generally ignore
how the character of the people who take part in arguments bears on that success
or failure. Virtue theories of argument seek to redress the balance, shifting the
perspective away from arguments as products and onto arguers as people.
One way to explore the character of arguers is to look at their virtues and vices.
Many instances of the traditional fallacies that logicians and argumentation the-
orists have been discussing since Aristotle can be analysed in terms of the vices
of the arguer who employs them or the audience that falls for them (Aberdein,
2016). But arguers can exhibit other vices that lead arguments to malfunction in
other ways. Some of these vices may correspond pretty closely to those famil-
iar from ethical contexts: we may be cowardly in not defending a position we
believe to be right, contemptuous of our opponent, or unfair in how we present
an opposing position. Other vices may be unique to argumentation, such as un-
willingness to revise our own position or unwillingness to engage in argument
in the first place. A fuller inventory of the vices of argument promises to help
explain how even the arguments that succeed by traditional lights can seem so
unsatisfactory. Conversely, cultivation of the corresponding virtues of argument
should improve the conduct and outcome of our arguments.
In virtue epistemology, a standard distinction is drawn between reliabilist
(broadly externalist) and responsibilist (broadly internalist) conceptions of virtue
(Axtell, 1997, 3). Heather Battaly helpfully reframes this as a distinction between
virtues as requiring good ends and virtues as requiring good motives respectively
(Battaly, 2015, 9). Of course, ideally, we would want virtuous activity both to be
well-motivated and to bring about a good end. But we don’t always get what
we want: so Battaly argues that we should accept as virtues dispositions which
only regularly meet one of these criteria. As an apposite example, consider the
virtue of being willing to listen to others. An arguer might act in this way for ul-
terior motives, perhaps to receive a good grade in a speech class, or because their
interlocutor told some good jokes. Nonetheless, their attentive listening might
inadvertently lead them to contribute to a virtuous argument. Conversely, a well-
motivated arguer could be unselfishly willing to listen to others, but consistently
unlucky in their choice of interlocutors, none of whom ever put forward an ar-
gument worth listening to, such that no good end ever came from the arguer’s
good motives. Obviously we hope to get both good ends and good motives, but
we need to consider the cases where only one of these is to be had.
Daniel Cohen has been making the case for a virtue theory of argumentation
as long as anyone. He proposes a set of negative exemplars: the deaf dogma-
tist, who won’t listen to the arguments of others; the concessionaire, who loses
arguments by being too ready to modify their own position, conceding things
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that weren’t actually at issue; the eager believer, a forthright advocate for what-
ever position they heard last; the unassuring assurer, who seeks to reassure other
parties who would not otherwise need reassurance—the “Not involved in hu-
man trafficking” T-shirt wearer of argumentation (Ginn, 2013); and the argument
provocateur, who launches into arguments at the slightest opportunity, with or
without regard to circumstances (Cohen, 2005, 61 ff.). Cohen characterizes some
of these figures as tragic heroes rather than exemplars of vice: they are heroic,
since there are important things they get right, but tragic, since their arguments
seldom work out for the best. For example, the argument provocateur is at least
willing to argue, even on sensitive matters where many others are unhelpfully
reticent; the problem is that he is always willing to argue. What I will term Co-
hen’s cardinal virtues of argument may be seen as means, each situated between
a pair of negative exemplars that represent the corresponding vices of excess and
deficiency. He distinguishes four such virtues: willingness to listen to others,
willingness to modify your own position, willingness to question the obvious,
and willingness to engage in serious argument. It is possible, but unnecessary
for present purposes, to subdivide each of his cardinal virtues and their corre-
sponding vices to include many other intellectual virtues and vices relevant to
argumentation (for details, see Aberdein, 2016, 415 f.).
5. Arrogance
I now wish to turn to the vice of arrogance, that I will maintain is particularly
relevant to a discussion of deep disagreement. Alessandra Tanesini draws a use-
ful distinction “between haughtiness and arrogance. The first is manifested as
disrespect toward other speakers; the second is an unwillingness to submit one-
self to the norms governing ordinary conversation and rational debate” (Tanesini,
2016, 85). While these two attitudes are often found together, they are conceptu-
ally distinct, and it is arrogance that is the more revealing object of study. Tanesini
proposes the following account of arrogance: “The speaker does not wish to im-
ply that his mere saying so makes the content of the assertion true, but he is
convinced that the mere fact that the assertion is his somehow secures its correct-
ness” (Tanesini, 2016, 84). The idea is that the arrogant person treats his views
as requiring a special sort of deference. There may be circumstances in which
this makes sense—Tanesini suggests the umpire whose decisions are binding in
a game (ibid.). Such an attitude is fine in that context, but few arguers are in that
context. In general, anyone adopting this attitude will be disposed to insulate
many (all?) of his beliefs from revision—a comprehensive failure of willingness
to modify. Elsewhere Tanesini draws explicit implications for argumentation, or
at least debate, from her account of intellectual arrogance (Tanesini, 2018, 222
ff.). The arrogant participant disregards the expected norms for the conduct of
debate. Specifically, the arrogant arguer makes claims that lack the expected level
of justification and ignores or dismisses calls to back up such claims; conversely
an arrogant respondent may treat the arguer’s claims as requiring an exceptional
level of justification or dismiss them out of hand.
I wish to connect Tanesini’s account of the arrogant arguer to two related ap-
proaches to arrogance. Firstly, Maura Priest has proposed an anti-asshole account
of humility; she’s defined humility as not being an asshole, which has an attrac-
tively blunt simplicity to it. She builds on Aaron James’s definition: “a person
counts as an asshole when, and only when, he systematically allows himself to
enjoy special advantages in interpersonal relations out of an entrenched sense of
entitlement that immunizes him against the complaints of other people” (James,
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2012, 4 f.). This has clear affinities with Tanesini’s account of arrogance. Priest’s
intellectually humble person is thus someone who doesn’t do that; someone who
• Respects the intellect of others as his own, and so rarely feels
immune to their complaints and criticisms.
• Systematically declines intellectual advantages in interper-
sonal relations because he feels no sense of entitlement (Priest,
2017, 469).
She goes on to link arrogance to disregard for intellectual autonomy. This makes
the arrogant person someone who cannot be trusted to use persuasion wisely:
“Behaviors commonly associated with this disregard include deception and ma-
nipulation” (Priest, 2017, 474). Such actions undermine intellectual autonomy by
manipulating persons into holding beliefs regardless of evidence or their own
intellectual process.
Secondly, Nancy Potter, in defending a virtue account of trustworthiness, stresses
the virtue of uptake:
To give uptake rightly, then, it is not enough simply to receive
another’s speech act with the conventional understanding. One
must appreciate and respond to the spirit in which something is
expressed, and one must take seriously what the speaker is trying
to say and the speaker’s reasons for saying it. One must have the
appropriate emotional and intellectual responses, engaging one’s
whole heart. Furthermore, one must recognize the responsibility
attending social and political privilege. Indeed, giving uptake
properly is partly constitutive of the kind of person one is—it
requires cultivation of a certain kind of character (Potter, 2002,
152).
Ultimately this idea is drawn from J. L. Austin, although it has mutated a fair bit
en route (Austin, 1962, 116): unlike Austin, Potter characterizes uptake itself as a
virtue. As such, uptake coincides closely with what Cohen and I call willingness
to listen to others. It requires a suitable level of appreciative listening (cf. Rice,
2011). This seems like an antithesis of arrogance and, I suggest, the sort of virtue
that is required in order to safely deploy tactics of persuasion that may resolve
deep disagreements.
How does all this connect to deep disagreement? Firstly, any disagreement
with an arrogant individual is more than likely to feel like deep disagreement,
even in cases where there is an easily accessible resolution. The phenomenology
of disagreeing with an arrogant person and of being in deep disagreement may be
similarly frustrating, even though their ultimate cause is quite different. The ori-
gin of the arrogant arguer’s unwillingness to back down and indifference to the
assertions of others lies in his character, not in the subject matter of the dispute.
Chris Campolo has expressed the worry that attempting to reason one’s way out
of a deep disagreement may do more harm than good (Campolo, 2019, 721). It can
give rise to a misleading sense of common ground. In terms of my topographical
analogy, such disagreements are concealed crevasses: the disputants believe that
they are addressing their differences when they are really ignoring them. Any
apparent resolution that may follow is likely to give way unexpectedly. Disagree-
ments with arrogant arguers can present a converse problem: what may initially
present as depth may be no more than intransigence. In topographical terms, this
may be thought of as an invisible bridge: despite outward appearances, there is
a safe path to common ground (even if some parties will be strongly resistant to
using it).
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Secondly, but perhaps more seriously, the arrogant individual is a risk factor
for some of the most promising strategies for resolution of deep disagreements.
Specifically, it is precisely the behaviour of the arrogant arguer that gives rise
to Wittgenstein’s worries about the missionaries and the natives. Strategies that
might find some way forward out of deep disagreement will, at the very least,
go up to the edge of what counts as rational argument. Such strategies require
particular care and attention. They are analogous to operating dangerous equip-
ment with all the safety protocols turned off: the operator needs to be constantly
vigilant about the associated risks. The arrogant person is entirely indifferent to
those risks, at least so far as they impact others. Hence he will be the sort of
person who gives persuasion a bad name, because, in so far as he has these tech-
niques at his disposal, he will use them to twist others to his view. Conversely,
the operation of the same techniques in conjunction with virtues that mitigate
against these risks, such as willingness to listen to others, potentially represents
a moral and practical way forward from deep disagreement.
As an example of a risky persuasion strategy consider “moral reframing”. Re-
cent social psychological research finds that “moral messages framed in a manner
consistent with the moral values of those already supporting the political stance
were less persuasive than moral arguments reframed to appeal to the values of
the intended audience—those who typically oppose the political position that the
messenger is arguing in favor of” (Feinberg and Willer, 2015, 1676). The empirical
research suggests that if you present an argument from your own moral frame
of reference then people who don’t share that frame of reference may be unper-
suaded, whereas if you reframe it in terms of your interlocutor’s frame of refer-
ence then there is a greater chance of success. Of course, the empirical research is
only concerned with determining if moral reframing is a successful technique, not
whether it is a virtuous technique. One concern about moral reframing is that it is
ad hominem, albeit in the least malign sense: Lockean ad hominem, or arguing
from the concessions of the other party; “internal argument” as it was termed
in §2. Even so, as Gary Jason observes of such arguments, “If I try to convince
you of C by citing P where you believe P, but I don’t, I am being illogical. I am
persuading you, not by sound argument, but by what I believe to be unsound
argument” (Jason, 1984, 185). I would not be arguing unsoundly if, instead of
arguing for C on the basis of P, I were to argue for “If P then C”, which I believe
to be true, and leave you to infer C from your (mistaken, by my lights) belief that
P. Nonetheless, I would still be reconciling myself to your coming to believe C on
the basis of what I take to be an unsound argument. This may seem a somewhat
recondite concern, but if you judge your opponents’ values to be intrinsically
reprehensible, then employing them in argument, however hypothetically, would
be inconsistent with your own values. For example, Sherman Clark considers a
critic of a new subway line, whose own opposition is grounded in economic argu-
ments, but who is tempted to persuade others with “a subtle appeal to race-based
fear—perhaps by hinting at or subtly evoking visions of ‘thugs’ from the other
side of town having easier access to good neighborhoods” (Clark, 2011, 852). As
Clark observes “you might also quite sensibly realize that by making that sort of
argument, even and perhaps especially if you did so indirectly and subtly, you
would not just be appealing to but also helping to construct and reinforce fear and
prejudice” (ibid.). So that sort of moral reframing would be not only vicious, but
a cause of vice in others. Nonetheless, Clark is not denouncing moral reframing;
on the contrary, he elsewhere states that “if we hope to be persuasive, we have
no choice but to navigate the worldviews of those we hope to persuade”, but he
also proposes that if we “truly engage with those we hope to reach, we might
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find that many people would respond as well or better to nobler appeals” (Clark,
2003, 73 f.). Used judiciously, moral reframing has the potential to be a construc-
tive strategy for dealing with deep disagreement. But its associated risks show
the importance of close attention to argumentative virtues in its deployment.
6. Conclusion
The dialogue in §1 may end in more than one way. Alice and Bob could
continue to sketch out competing worldviews without getting any closer together:
a classic deep disagreement. Alternatively, it might become clear that one of them
is refusing to back down from arrogance, not epistemic principle. In that case, the
disagreement need not be deep, although it may prove just as hard to resolve. Or,
in either of these cases, Alice or Bob may succeed in persuading the other. Such
persuasion may involve techniques that go beyond argumentation, at least as
narrowly defined. If either of them succumbs to arrogance, such persuasion may
be no more than browbeating. Winning the argument on these terms provides
no reason to think the winner is in the right epistemically (and good reason to
think they’re in the wrong ethically). But, if such persuasion is conducted with
humility, and the other attendant virtues of argument, it may lead the other party
to a sincere shift of worldview. That may not count for much if all that’s at stake is
the identity of the world’s second highest mountain, but on more worldly matters
it can be of paramount importance.
References
Aberdein, Andrew. 2016. The vices of argument. Topoi 35(2): 413–422.
Aberdein, Andrew. 2020. Courageous arguments and deep disagreements. Topoi
Forthcoming.
Adams, David M. 2005. Knowing when disagreements are deep. Informal Logic
25(1): 65–77.
Aikin, Scott F. 2019. Deep disagreement, the dark enlightenment, and the rhetoric
of the red pill. Journal of Applied Philosophy 36(3): 420–435.
Austin, John Langshaw. 1962. How To Do Things With Words. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Axtell, Guy. 1997. Recent work in virtue epistemology. American Philosophical
Quarterly 34(1): 1–27.
Barris, Jeremy. 2015. Metaphysics, deep pluralism, and paradoxes of informal
logic. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23(1): 59–84.
Battaly, Heather. 2015. A pluralist theory of virtue. In Current Controversies in
Virtue Theory, ed. Mark Alfano, 7–22. London: Routledge.
Campolo, Chris. 2005. Treacherous ascents: On seeking common ground for
conflict resolution. Informal Logic 25(1): 37–50.
Campolo, Chris. 2019. On staying in character: Virtue and the possibility of deep
disagreement. Topoi 38(4): 719–723.
Clark, Sherman J. 2003. The character of persuasion. Ave Maria Law Review 1(1):
61–79.
Clark, Sherman J. 2011. What we make matter. Michigan Law Review 109(6): 849–
862.
Cohen, Daniel H. 2005. Arguments that backfire. In The Uses of Argument, eds.
David Hitchcock and Daniel Farr, 58–65. Hamilton, ON: OSSA.
Davson-Galle, Peter. 1992. Arguing, arguments, and deep disagreements. Informal
Logic 14(2–3): 147–156.
ARROGANCE AND DEEP DISAGREEMENT 11
Duran, Claudio. 2016. Levels of depth in deep disagreement. In Argumentation,
Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016, eds. Patrick
Bondy and Laura Benacquista. Windsor, ON: OSSA.
Feinberg, Matthew and Robb Willer. 2015. From gulf to bridge: When do moral
arguments facilitate political influence? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
41(12): 1665–1681.
Feldman, Richard. 2005. Deep disagreement, rational resolutions, and critical
thinking. Informal Logic 25(1): 13–23.
Finocchiaro, Maurice A. 2011. Deep disagreements: A meta-argumentation ap-
proach. In Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th Interna-
tional Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May
18–21, 2011, ed. Frank Zenker. Windsor, ON: OSSA.
Fogelin, Robert J. 1985. The logic of deep disagreements. Informal Logic 7(1): 1–8.
Freud, Sigmund. 1961. Civilization and its Discontents. New York, NY: W. W.
Norton. Translated by James Strachey.
Ga¨rdenfors, Peter. 1988. Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic
States. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Ginn, Mike (@shutupmikeginn). 2013. My “Not involved in human trafficking”
T-shirt has people asking a lot of questions already answered by my shirt. URL
https://twitter.com/shutupmikeginn/status/403359911481839617. No-
vember 20 2013, 10:11 p.m. Tweet.
Godden, David and William H. Brenner. 2010. Wittgenstein and the logic of deep
disagreement. Cogency 2(2): 41–80.
Goodwin, Jean. 2005. Designing premises. In Argumentation in Practice, eds.
Frans H. van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser, 99–114. Amsterdam: John Ben-
jamins Publishing.
Hannon, Michael. 2019. Are political disagreements real disagree-
ments? Quillette Online at https://quillette.com/2019/08/20/
are-political-disagreements-real-disagreements/.
Hannon, Michael. 2020. Political disagreement or partisan badmouthing? The
role of expressive discourse in politics. In Routledge Handbook of Political Episte-
mology, eds. Michael Hannon and Jeroen de Ridder. London: Routledge. Forth-
coming.
Harvey, Jerry B. 1974. The Abilene paradox: The management of agreement.
Organizational Dynamics 3(1): 63–80.
James, Aaron. 2012. Assholes: A Theory. New York, NY: Doubleday.
Jason, Gary James. 1984. Is there a case for ad hominem arguments? Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 62(2): 182–185.
Jønch-Clausen, Karin and Klemens Kappel. 2015. Social epistemic liberalism and
the problem of deep epistemic disagreements. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
18: 371–384.
Kappel, Klemens. 2012. The problem of deep disagreement. Discipline Filosofiche
22(2): 7–25.
Kirmse, Andrew and Jonathan de Ferranti. 2017. Calculating the prominence and
isolation of every mountain in the world. Progress in Physical Geography 41(6):
788–802.
Kraus, Manfred. 2012. Cultural diversity, cognitive breaks, and deep disagree-
ment: Polemic argument. In Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory, eds.
Frans H. van Eemeren and Bart Garssen, 91–107. Dordrecht: Springer.
Lynch, Michael P. 2010. Epistemic circularity and epistemic incommensurability.
In Social Epistemology, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard, 262–277.
12 ANDREW ABERDEIN
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lynch, Michael P. 2012. In Praise of Reason: Why Rationality Matters for Democracy.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Memedi, Vesel. 2007. Resolving deep disagreement. In Dissensus and the Search
for Common Ground, ed. Hans V. Hansen. Windsor, ON: OSSA.
Mill, John Stuart. 1977 [1869]. The subjection of women. In Collected Works of John
Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson, vol. 21, 259–340. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press.
Phillips, Dana. 2008. Investigating the shared background required for argument:
A critique of Fogelin’s thesis on deep disagreement. Informal Logic 28(2): 86–
101.
Potter, Nancy Nyquist. 2002. How Can I Be Trusted? A Virtue Theory of Trustworthi-
ness. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Priest, Maura. 2017. Intellectual humility: An interpersonal theory. Ergo 4(16):
463–480.
Rice, Suzanne. 2011. Toward an Aristotelian conception of good listening. Educa-
tional Theory 61(2): 141–153.
Schaffner, Brian F and Samantha Luks. 2018. Misinformation or expressive re-
sponding? What an inauguration crowd can tell us about the source of political
misinformation in surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly 82(1): 135–147.
Siegel, Harvey. 2014. Argumentation and the epistemology of disagreement. In
Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013, eds.
Dima Mohammed and Marcin Lewin´ski. Windsor, ON: OSSA.
Tanesini, Alessandra. 2016. “Calm down, dear”: Intellectual arrogance, silencing
and ignorance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. 90: 71–92.
Tanesini, Alessandra. 2018. Arrogance, anger and debate. Symposion 5(2): 213–
227.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1972. On Certainty. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Zarefsky, David. 2012. The appeal for transcendence: A possible response to cases
of deep disagreement. In Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory, eds. Frans H.
van Eemeren and Bart Garssen, 77–89. Dordrecht: Springer.
